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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Concluding The Testimony Presented At The Preliminary 
Hearing Did Not Establish Probable Cause To Believe McLe"an Committed The Crime 
Of Video Voyeurism 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it concluded that the testimony presented during the 
preliminary hearing did not establish probable cause to believe McLe"an committed the 
crime of video voyeurism, I.C. § 18-6609. Contrary to the district court's opinion, "the 
state was not required to establish that McLe"an had the intent to sexually degrade or 
abuse Natalie [N.] when he obtained her images.,,1 (Appe"ant's Brief, pp.6-12.) 
Because the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing provided probable cause to 
believe McLe"an committed the public offense of video voyeurism, the district court 
erred in dismissing the charge. 
1 I. C. § 18-6609(2)(b) provides in relevant part: 
(2) A person is guilty of video voyeurism when, with the intent of arousing, 
appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such 
person or another person, or for his own or another person's lascivious 
entertainment or satisfaction of prurient interest, or for the purpose of 
sexually degrading or abusing any other person: 
(b) He intentionally disseminates, publishes or sells any 
image or images of the intimate areas of another person or 
persons without the consent of such other person or persons 
and with knowledge that such image or images were 
obtained with the intent set forth above. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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In response, McLellan argues that I.C.R. 5.1 (b)'s requirement that probable 
cause be established in regard to the "offense charged" should be interpreted as 
including the manner in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. Based on 
this interpretation of the rule, McLellan argues the prosecution was required to show he 
had the intent to sexually degrade or abuse Natalie when he obtained her images, as 
alleged in the criminal complaint. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-15.) McLellan further 
asserts that "the mere fact that a video depicts an image of a woman - who is aware of 
the presence of the camera - removes [sic] her clothing while being filmed to the point 
where she is completely naked does not ipso facto establish any of the specific intents 
required under I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b)." (Respondent's Brief, p.17.) 
Both of McLellan's arguments are fatally flawed. The plain language of I.C.R. 
5.1 (b) shows it is the named offense which constitutes the "offense charged," not the 
theory of the manner in which the offense was committed. Because the magistrate 
court had probable cause to find McLellan committed the offense charged -- video 
voyeurism -- it was error for the district court to dismiss the charge. Further, McLellan's 
contention that the video he obtained of Natalie undressing and exposing her intimate 
body areas to the camera did not establish probable cause to believe the image was 
obtained to appeal to sexual desires runs counter to all common sense and reason. 
B. The Prosecution Was Required To Establish Probable Cause Only By Showing 
McLellan Committed The Crime Of Video Voyeurism 
In its opening brief, the state argued that regardless of which of the various 
intents described in I.C. § 18-6609(2) McLellan had when he disseminated the video of 
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Natalie on the Internet, as long as the evidence presented showed he had anyone of 
the intents - and not necessarily the same one - when he obtained the video, there was 
probable cause to hold him to answer in the district court.2 See I.C.R. 5.1 (b) ("sha" 
forthwith hold the defendant to answer in the district court"). McLe"an does not appear 
to contest that general reading of I.C. § 18-6609(2). (See Respondent's Brief, pp.9-15.) 
Nor does McLe"an defend the district court's errant determination that the state is 
required to show the video was obtained without the consent of Natalie. (See id.) 
However, McLe"an insists that, under I.C.R. 5.1 (b), a probable cause finding cannot 
merely be based upon deciding whether there is sufficient evidence to show a public 
offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it. Instead, McLe"an 
argues that the prosecution must additionally show the defendant committed the offense 
in the precise manner, or on the same theory, as described in the criminal complaint. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.10-15.) McLe"an is incorrect not only in his interpretation of 
I.C.R. 5.1 (b), but also in his underlying assumption that the criminal complaint alleged 
he obtained the video of Natalie with the intent to sexually degrade or abuse her.3 
2 If I.C. § 18-6609(2) were deemed to require the same intent be shown when a video 
is both obtained and disseminated, the statute would preclude prosecution in situations 
where, as here, a video obtained by a man showing the intimate parts of his girlfriend 
for erotic purposes, is later - after the relationship sours - intentionally disseminated on 
the Internet to embarrass or degrade her sexually. Such a reading of the statute, apart 
from not abiding by its plain language, would be ludicrous. 
3 McLe"an repeatedly asserts that the criminal complaint alleged he had the intent to 
sexually degrade or abuse Natalie when he obtained the video. (Respondent's Brief, 
p.11 ("the State in this case only alleged one of these intents in both its criminal 
complaint and the subsequent Information: that Mr. McLe"an had the intent to sexually 
abuse and degrade N.N. both at the time of publishing or disseminating the images of 
her and at the time of obtaining these images."); p.13 ("the State admittedly only 
3 
Finally, even if he were correct, the state should be given the opportunity to amend the 
complaint to conform to the evidence. 
The plain language of LC.R. 5.1 (b) is the standard that must be met to 
successfully challenge a probable cause determination. Rule 5.1 (b) states that 
probable cause is to be found "[i]f from the evidence the magistrate determines that a 
public offense has been committed and that there is probable or sufficient cause to 
believe that the defendant committed such offense[,]" and "[t]he finding of probable 
cause shall be based upon sUbstantial evidence upon every material element of the 
offense charged[.]"4 (See Appellant's Brief, p.? (emphasis added).) Rather than adhere 
to the plain language of LC.R. 5.1 (b), McLellan re-interprets the phrase "the offense 
charged Mr. McLellan with video voyeurism under the theory that he had obtained the 
video images of N.N.'s intimate areas with the intent to sexually abuse and degrade her, 
and that he had knowledge that the video was obtained with this intent."); p.15 ("the 
State did not provide sufficient evidence with regard to the intent element as charged by 
the State"). 
4 McLellan's argument that the state failed to present any authority to support its 
argument is not well taken. (See Respondent's Brief, p.12.) The state's opening brief 
set forth the standard of review, stating at the outset: 
A defendant challenging the sufficiency of evidence presented at a 
preliminary hearing must demonstrate that the State failed to present 
substantial evidence as to every material element of the offense charged. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1 (b). 
(Appellant's Brief, p.? (emphasis added).) 
That the state did not anticipate Respondent would redefine the apparent plain 
meaning of "the offense charged," and did not cite authority to interpret what I.C.R. 
5.1 (b) already clearly states, does not constitute a waiver of the issue. See State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996) ("When issues on appeal are not 
supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered."). 
Respondent has not provided any authority to support the notion that an appellant must 
anticipate the responses to its opening brief and rebut them in advance. 
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charged" as having the additional meaning of the theory of how the crime was 
committed. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.13-14 ("Therefore, under the plain terms of this 
rule, the measure of whether probable cause has been established is based upon the 
offense as it has been charged by the State - it is not whether the magistrate believes 
that any offense has been committed.").) 
LC.R. 5.1 (b), however, makes no mention of the theory or manner in which an 
offense is alleged to have been committed. To the contrary, it initially states in simple 
terms that if a magistrate "determines that a public offense" has been committed and 
there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed "such offense" he shall be 
held "to answer in the district court." (Emphasis added.) The rule then requires that the 
probable cause finding "shall be based upon substantial evidence upon every material 
element of the offense charged." LC.R. 5.1 (b) (emphasis added). Under the plain 
language of LC.R. 5.1 (b), it was only necessary for the prosecution to establish 
probable cause for the magistrate to believe that the crime of video voyeurism had been 
committed, and that McLellan committed it. See State v. State, Dept. of Health & 
Welfare, 125 Idaho 227, 228-229, 869 P.2d 227, 228-229 (1994) (applying plain 
meaning rule to LA.R. 11 (c)(9), in regard to appealable orders and substantive rights of 
parties). 
Nowhere does LC.R. 5.1 (b) even hint that, in order to hold a defendant to answer 
in district court, anything more is required than probable cause to believe a crime was 
committed and that the defendant committed it. Idaho's appellate courts appear to fully 
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agree. In State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 299, 912 P.2d 664, 667 (Ct. App. 1995), 
the Idaho Court of Appeals explained: 
At the preliminary hearing the State is not required to prove the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, it need only show that a crime 
was committed and that there is probable cause to believe the accused 
committed it. State v. Horn, 101 Idaho 192, 195, 610 P.2d 551, 554 
(1980); State v. Greensweig, 102 Idaho 794, 641 P.2d 340 (Ct. App. 
1982). The denial of a motion to dismiss following a preliminary hearing 
will not be disturbed on appeal if, under any reasonable view of the 
evidence including permissible inferences, it appears likely that an offense 
occurred and that the accused committed it. State v. Williams, 103 Idaho 
635,651 P.2d 569 (Ct. App. 1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Pierce, 107 Idaho 96,99,685 P.2d 837, 840 (Ct. App. 1984). 
(Emphasis added.) 
Stated another way, a magistrate's finding of probable cause at a preliminary 
hearing will not be disturbed if, under any reasonable view of the evidence, including 
permissible inferences, it appears likely that (1) an offense occurred and (2) that the 
accused committed it. Holcomb, 128 Idaho at 299, 912 P.2d at 667. Moreover, those 
two showings are the only requisites that the state is required to prove in order to 
establish probable cause to bind a defendant over to district court. lQ,.; see State v. 
Pole, 139 Idaho 370,372,79 P.3d 729,731 (Ct. App. 2003) ("the state need only show 
that a crime was committed and that there is probable cause to believe the accused 
committed it"); Cowles Pub. Co. v. First District Mag. Ct., 118 Idaho 753,762,800 P.2d 
640, 649 (1990) (same); State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 84,774 P.2d 252, 254 (1989) 
(same); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 57, 675 P.2d 33, 36 (1983) ("it is sufficient to 
state that the evidence produced by the State at the preliminary hearing established that 
a crime had been committed and a reasonable person would believe that Gibson had 
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probably or likely participated in the commission of the offense charged"). McLellan's 
contention that, in order to hold him to answer in the district court, the prosecution was 
required to show probable cause to believe he committed the crime of video voyeurism 
in the precise manner alleged in the criminal complaint runs counter to both the plain 
language of I.C.R. 5.1 (b) and Idaho case law. 
In addition, McLellan's argument about the interpretation of I.C.R. 5.1 (b) is based 
upon the attendant assumption that the criminal complaint alleged he obtained the video 
of Natalie with the intent to sexually degrade or abuse her. (See n.3, supra.) However, 
the criminal complaint does not include anything about the intent McLellan allegedly had 
when he obtained the video of her; in fact, the complaint does not reference the 
"obtained" element of video voyeurism at all.5 (R., pp.5-6.) Therefore, McLellan'S 
argument that the state had to show probable cause in conformity with the complaint's 
allegation that he had the intent to sexually degrade or abuse Natalie when he obtained 
the video is wholly misplaced. While omission of the "obtained" element of video 
voyeurism in the complaint may be a pleading irregularity, it does not constitute a basis 
5 The Criminal Complaint alleges in relevant part: 
That the Defendant, CHRIS J MCLELLEN [sic], on or between 
2/1/10 and the 1ih day of November, 2010, in the County of Ada, State of 
Idaho, did with the purpose of sexually degrading and/or abusing another 
person, to-wit: Natalie [N.], did intentionally disseminate, publish or sell 
any image or images of the intimate areas of Natalie [N.] without the 
consent of Natalie [N.] and with the knowledge that the image or images 
would sexually abuse or degrade her. 
(R., p.6.) 
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for refusing to find probable cause to believe McLellan committed the crime of video 
voyeurism under I.C.R. 5.1 (b). 
Finally, the rules of procedure allow the state to amend its charging document to 
conform to the evidence up until the state rests at trial. I.C.R. 7(e); State v. Owen, 129 
Idaho 920, 934, 935 P.2d 183, 197 (Ct. App. 1997). Even assuming that McLellan is 
right, it does not show that the district court did not err by dismissing the charge 
because the error McLellan asserts for the first time on appeal could be cured by 
amendment. 
C. The Prosecution Established Probable Cause To Believe McLellan Had One Of 
The Sexual Intents Described By I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b) When He Obtained The 
Video Of Natalie 
McLellan next argues that the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing 
was insufficient to establish that he had any of the sexual intents set forth in I.C. § 18-
6609(2)6 when he obtained the video of Natalie. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-18.) The 
preliminary hearing testimony shows otherwise. At that hearing, the prosecution 
presented testimony by three witnesses who together described the video as showing 
Natalie undressing in front of the camera to a point where her entire naked body was 
displayed, including her breasts, vagina, and buttocks. (3/3/11 Tr., p.7, L.22 - p.8, L.13; 
p.15, Ls.14-25; p.27, Ls.8-13.) The video also showed Natalie looking at the camera 
several times. (Tr., p.29, Ls.1-3.) Natalie testified that during the time she and 
6 To reiterate, the intents include "the intent of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the 
lust or passions or sexual desires of such person or another person, or for his own or 
another person's lascivious entertainment or satisfaction of prurient interest, or for the 
purpose of sexually degrading or abusing any other person[.]" 
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McLe"an were together (romantica"y), she participated with him in making at least one 
"naked video[]," but never gave him permission to publish videos of her naked. (3/3/11 
Tr., p.16, L.17 - p.17, L.6; p.19, Ls.14-17.) When Natalie viewed the videos of herself 
on the internet, which showed the intimate areas of her body, she "was disgusted." 
(3/3/11 Tr., p.17, L.19 - p.1S, L.6.) 
McLe"an specifically argues that "[t]he mere fact that a video was obtained that 
depicts a woman undressing to the point of nakedness does not, of itself, demonstrate 
that this image was initially obtained 'with the intent of arousing, appealing to or 
gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person [etc.].'" (Respondent's 
Brief, p.1S.) However, the combination of circumstances and reasonable inferences 
surrounding McLe"an's obtaining of the "naked video" of Natalie support a probable 
cause finding that he had one (or more) of the sexual intents described in I.C. § 1S-
6609(2). As stated in State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 506, SO P.3d 1103, 1107 (Ct. App. 
2003): 
Case law supports the state's argument that intent may be inferred from 
the defendant's conduct or from circumstantial evidence. See State v. 
Pole, 79 P.3d 729 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43,47, 13 
P.3d 1256, 1260 (Ct. App. 2000). Additiona"y, I.C. § 1S-115 provides that 
"intent or intention is manifested by the commission of the acts and 
surrounding circumstances connected with the offense." 
The preliminary hearing testimony supports the finding of probable cause to 
believe that McLe"an had a sexual intent when he, as Natalie's boyfriend, videotaped 
her while she undressed to the point of exposing her entire naked body, including her 
breasts, vagina, and buttocks. Natalie's act of disrobing while McLe"an videotaped her 
had the earmark of a striptease. It defies common sense and reason to believe there 
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was anything but a sexual intent on the part of McLellan, Natalie's boyfriend at the time, 
when he videotaped her disrobing until totally naked, and with her intimate areas 
exposed to his video camera. Any rational appraisal of human nature would understand 
that the likelihood McLellan did not have one of the sexual intents described in I.C. § 18-
6609(2) is remote. 
In view of the surrounding circumstances and the reasonable inferences to be 
made from the testimony presented during the preliminary hearing, the prosecution 
provided the magistrate court with probable cause showing the offense of video 
voyeurism was committed, and that McLellan was the person who committed that 
offense. 
Based upon the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, the magistrate's 
conclusion that there was probable cause to find McLellan committed the public offense 
of video voyeurism was correct, and the district court erred by ruling otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the order dismissing this 
case, reinstate the Information, and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 13th day of September, 2012. 
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